Please join the Center for Mathematics Education (MathEd) and the Maryland Equity Project (MEP) for a joint kick-off to the 2019-20 colloquia series! Come for the whole session, or stay for part.
Date: Friday, October 4
- Time:
- 10:30-11:30 am for MathEd talk
- 11:30 am-12 pm for lunch
- 12-1 pm for MEP talk
Location: College of Education/Benjamin Building 2121
MathEd Talk Details: Dr. David Blazar (Assistant Professor, TLPL) will present a paper titled, "Examining Challenges and Tradeoffs of `Good' Teaching in Mathematics: How Can Teachers Raise Test Scores While Engaging Students in Class?" Abstract: Theories of teaching and learning have long emphasized the complex role teachers play in supporting students’ academic and social development. Using a dataset in which teachers were randomly assigned to students paired with observations of instruction and a student survey, we examined why teachers who are successful at raising math test scores often are less successful at engaging students in class (and vice versa). Quantitative analyses indicate that gains in math achievement result from instructional practices (e.g., cognitively demanding, error-free math content) in ways that closely align with theories on “good” teaching, but do not reveal clear mechanisms that support students’ engagement in class. Qualitative observations of lessons provide some insight, including the benefit of active mathematics for student engagement.
Maryland Equity Project Talk Details: Dr. Jane Lincove (Associate Professor, University of Maryland Baltimore County) will present a paper titled, "When the Walls Come Down: Evidence from New Orleans on Teacher Labor Markets in the Absence of Unions, Tenure, and Certification Rules". Abstract: Some education observers argue that teacher labor markets are inefficient and perhaps inequitable because union contracts and government regulation limit school autonomy over matters such as hiring, evaluation, compensation, and working conditions. If government regulation were removed to allow a more competitive teacher labor market, then schools might be able to do more to retain their high-performing teachers. We provide empirical evidence on the topic by comparing teacher exits from charter schools in New Orleans with neighboring traditional public school districts. Our results suggest schools in the market setting of New Orleans were more responsive to value-added quality measures than similar schools in neighboring districts with collective bargaining agreements and traditional governance structures. In particular, we find evidence that schools in market settings are more likely to exit low-performing teachers and to retain high-quality teachers. We also find some evidence that schools compete for high-performing teachers by offering higher salaries to teachers at other schools, but do not use pay-for-performance for teachers they retain. While these results suggest that the New Orleans teacher labor market is more responsive to performance, the much higher average turnover rate, combined with supply constraints, may be reducing the initial quality of entering teachers over time. Overall, then, it is not clear whether New Orleans does a better job than traditional districts of ensuring that students have high-quality teachers.